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STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

1.

A.

Nature of the Case.

This case was filed as an appeal, pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, LC.
§ 67-5201 et seq., from a "Final Order" of the Idaho Department of Lands (DL). The subject Order

was entered following a coiisolidated contested case hearing on separate applications for singlefamily docks (made pursuant to the Lake Protection Act, LC. § 58-1301 et seq.) that were filed by
Lake CDA Investments and Chris Keenan (the Respondents).
The Respondents' properties are traversed by a right-of-way easement for the benefit of the
State. That right-of-way is administered by ITD. ITD objected to the applications, claiming that the
Respondents' properties were divested of littoral rights (and hence, the right of wharfage) by virtue
of ITD's right-of-way easement. Following the consolidated contested case hearing, IDL agreed and
entered its order denying the requested encroachment permits.
Respondents timely appealed IDL's Order to the Kootenai County District Court. Those
appealswere consolidated. ITD thereafter intervened. Following briefing and argument, the District
Court entered its "Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal." After finding that IDL's decision
found "no support in the law," the District Court vacated IDL's order and remanded the matter for
further consistent proceedings. Pursuant to LC. 512-117, the District Court thereafter granted the
Respondents' request for an award of attorney fees and costs. ITD and IDL timely appealed from
the District Court. Those appeals have been consolidated by order of this Court.'
1

For purposes of this Brief, the following acronyms will be used to refer to matters of
record. First, the acronym "CR" will be used to refer to the two (2) volumes of the Clerk's Record
on Appeal (which include matters on file with the Kootenai County District Court subsequent to the
filing of the Respondents' separate "Petitions for Review" under IDAPA). Second, the acronym
"Tr." will be used to refer to the "Transcript on Appeal" before the District Court. Third, the

B.

Course of Proceedings.
1.

The Lake CDA Investments Encroachment Permit Application.

Lake CDA Investments owns Lot 3 of Carrs' Marina View Estates in Kootenai
County. AR, p. 17. At the time Lake CDA Investments applied to IDL for an encroachment permit,
its two adjacent littoral neighbors were Thomas Hudson (hereafter "Hudson") and Rick Carr. AR,
pp. 17-22. The Lake CDA Investments, Hudson, and Carr properties are all contiguous littoral
properties located waterward of an expanse of former Interstate 90 lying east of the City of Coeur
d7Alene(the roadway is now known as "Coeur d7AleneLake Drive").
Lake CDA Investments applied for a non-commercial etlcroachment permit authorizing the
installation of a single-family dock on its littoral property. AR at pp. 17-22. The application was
dated July 31,2006 and received by IDL on August 2,2006. AR at p. 24.
LC. 5 58-1305(a) provides:
Applications for construction . . . of navigational encroachments not
extending beyond the line of navigability nor intended primarily for
commercial use shall he processed by the Board with the minimum
of procedural requirements and shall not be denied nor appearance
required except in the most unusual circumstances or if the vrovosed
encroachment infrin~esupon or it appears it may infringe upon the
riparian or littoral rights of an adjacent propertv owner.
See LC. 5 58-1305(a) (emphasis added).
LC. 5 58-1305(c) provides:
In the event objection to the application is filed by an adjacent owner
. . . the Board &
a
J fix a time, no later than sixty (60) days &om the
acronym "AR" will be used to refer to the initial "Agency Record" lodged with the District Court
by D L . Fourth, the acronym "Amended AR" will be used to refer to the "Amended Agency Record"
lodged with the District Court by IDL. Finally, included in the "Amended Agency Record," at
Document 16, is a transcript of proceedings related to the contested case hearing held before D L .
2

date of filing application, and aplace, for affording the applicant and
adjacent owner filing objection to appear and present evidence in
support of or in opposition to the application and within forty-five
(45) days thereafter shall render a decision . . . .
See LC. $ 58-1305(c) (emphasis added).
IDL provided notice of Lake CDA Investments' application to Carr, Hudson,

the Idaho

Department of Transportation (ITD). AR at pp. 46-48. ITD owned no adjacent property with littoral
rights that would otherwise have qualified ITD for notice under LC. 5 58-1305(b). Carr advised IDL
that he did not object. AR at p. 49. The Hudsons advised IDL that they objected (notwithstanding
the fact that they themselves had previously made a successful application for a private
encroachment (dock) on their adjacent littoral property). AR at pp. 50-5 1. ITD also objected to Lake
CDA Investments' application. AR at p. 53. However, ITD's objection was clearly untimely in that
it was made at least twenty-four (24) days after the September 16,2006 due date. AR at pp. 46,53.
See also LC. $ 58-1305(b).
-Notwithstandingthe untimeliness ofDOT's objection, andnotwithstandingthe clear mandate
of LC. $ 58-1305(c) (requiring a hearing on a timely objection (the Hudson objection)), IDL
unilaterally denied Lake CDA Investments' application. AR at p. 56. Lake CDA Investments then
filed its initial Petition for Review on November 22,2006. CR, Vol. I, pp. 1-13. That Petition was
assigned Kootenai County Case No. CV-06-8728.
The fact that IDL had acted in derogation of Lake CDA Investments' rights to due process
and the statutoryprotections set forth in the Lake Protection Act (LPA) at LC. $58-1305 were clear.
Accordingly, IDL stipulated to stay the appeal before the District Court so as to allow for further
administrative proceedings compliant with the requirements of the LPA.

2.

Keenan's Lake Encroachment Permit Application.

On November 17,2006, Chris Keenan (Keenan) made application pursuant to the
LPA for anon-commercial navigational encroachment (a single-family dock). Amended AR at Ex.
25, p. 170. Keenan had acquired Lot 2 of Carrs' Marina View Estates. Id. Keenan's littoral lot was
bounded by the Lake CDA Investments' lot (Lot 3) and a lot owned by Rick and Jan Can (Lot 1).
Lake CDA Investments and Carr, as the two adjacent littoral owners to Keenan, consented
to the application. There is no record evidence of any objection having been interposed, timely or
otherwise, to the Keenan application by any adjacent littoral owner. Further, there is no record
evidence of any objection having been interposed, timely or otherwise, by ITD.'
On January 24,2007, IDL entered an "Order for Contested Case Hearing," together with a
"Notice of Appointment of Hearing Officer." AR at pp. 75-78. IDL gave notice of the appointment
of D L employee Jim Brady to conduct a contested case hearing and to develop a recommendation
to be made to IDL's Director. Id.For purposes of the hearings, IDL consolidated the Lake CDA
Investments' application (given that the judicial appeal had been stayed so as to facilitate
administrative proceedings) with the Keenan application (to which

timely or recorded objection

had been interposed by either an owner of an adjacent littoral property or ITD).

2

The Hearing Examiner referenced a January 8, 2007 letter from ITD to D L
recommending denial of the Keenan's application. CR, Vol. I, p. 26. However, this document was
not included in the administrative record. The document was proffered into the record on appeal,
without an accompanying motion to augment, by ITD's counsel. CR, Vol. 11,pp. 145-149. In the
referenced objection, ITD states that as to Keenan, "there may not be a riparian right remaining on
the five acre parcel subdivided and ... sold to Mr. [sic] Keenan." In any event, ITD's objection was
untimely under LC. $58-1305(b). The objection was received more than ten (10) days from the date
of the application (which, under $58-1305(b), "shall be deemed sufficient notice if the adjacent
owner is the State of Idaho").

3.

Administrative Proceedings Before IDL.

On March 30, 2007, IDL held a contested case hearing on the consolidated Lake CDA
Investments and Keeiian applications. AR at p. 145. Testimony was taken of Jan Carr, Rick Carr,
Thomas Hudson, and Dirk Roeller (a professional land surveyor employed by ITD). The parties
additionally submitted written briefing and exhibits were introduced and received in the record.
On May 18, 2007, Hearing Officer Brady issued his recommended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of AR at pp. 142-54. Brady recommended that both requested encroachment permits
be denied. Td.On May 21,2007, IDLDirector George Bacon entered aFinal Order adopting Brady's
recommendations. Id.at pp. 155-57.
4.

Subsequent Proceedings.

On June 7,2007, Lake CDA Investments filed a First Amended Petition for Review
(in Kootenai County Case No. CV-06-8728), seeking appellatereview,pursuant to IDAPA, of DL'S
May 21,2007 Final Order denying its requested permit. CR, Vol. I, p. 14. On the same day, Keenan
separately filed her Petition for Review from the same Order. That Petition was assigned Kootenai
County Case No. CV-07-4069.
ITD subsequently moved to intervene. By Order entered July 10,2007, the Court authorized
ITD's requested intervention. CR, Vol. I, p. 45. By subsequent Order, entered August 7,2007, the
two pending appeals were consolidated. CR, Vol. I, p. 50.
Following briefing and argument, the Court entered its "Memoraiidum Decision and Order
on Appeal," finding that IDL's denial of the requested permits was unsupported in law. CR., Vol.

11, pp. 299-335. The Court subsequently entered monetaryjudgments in favor of the Respondents,
and against ITD and D L , awarding attorney fees under LC. $12-117 for the fees incurred by

Respondents on appeal. CR, Vol. II,pp. 418-30. Both ITD and IDL have timely appealed to this
Court.
C.

Statement of Pacts.
1.

General Overview of Area in Question.

This appeal relates to two (2) separate applications for single family docks made by two
adjacent littoral property owners, Respondents Lake CDA Investments and Keenan. In order to
acquaint the Court with the relationship of the Respondents' separate properties, and the general
geographic area encompassing the same, certain materials have been excerpted in the Addendum to
this Brief. Those materials are discussed more fully below for the Court's convenience.
Attached hereto for illustrative purposes, as Addendum No. 1, is an aerial photograph
showing the location of the three (3) parcels created by the Carrs' Marina View Estates Plat.
Amended AR, Ex. 10,pp. 130-32 (Carr's Marinaview Estates Plat). These parcels include the Lake
CDA Investments parcel (Lot 3) and the Keenan parcel (Lot 2). The same plat also created Lot 1.
Lot 1 is owned by Rick and Jan Carr. Lot 1 has an existing dock that dates back nearly seventy (70)
years and which will be discussed more fully below in the context of Clyde Stranahan (the individual
who sold the entire parcel to the Carrs who in turn then recorded the plat, creating Lots 1,2, and 3).
AddendumNo. 1 shows the relationship between the Lake CDA Investments' lot (Lot 3) and
the adjacent littoral property (owned by the Hudsons). Addendum No. 1 further shows the
relationship between the Carrlstranahanproperty (Lot 1)andits adjacent littoral neighbor, theBeach
House MarinaISilver Beach pr~perty.~
3

AddendumNo. 1, in the precise form attached hereto, was not included as an actual
exhibit in the Administrative Record. However, it is offered herein purely for illustrative purposes
to acquaint the Court with the area in question. The matters depicted on Addendum No. 1 are a

Addendum No. 2 consists of an aerial photograph that shows a wider view of the matters
depicted in Addendum No. 1. Amended AR, Ex. 9, p. 128 (aerial photograph). Depicted in the
photograph is the Beach House Marina and the existing encroachment on the CmlStranahan
property (Lot 1 of Carrs' Marina View Estates). This encroachment can be seen as the red-covered
boat slip lying slightly southeast of the Beach House Marina. Also depicted is the expanse of
property between the Cardstranahan parcel (Lot 1) and the Hudson parcel. This expanse includes
the properties giving rise to this proceeding (Lot 2 (Keenan) and Lot 3 (Lake CDA Investments)).
Addendum No. 3 is an additional aerial photograph, with a more expansive view than the
photographs included as Addendum No. 1 and 2. Amended AR, Ex. A, p. 5. Addendum No. 3
shows the area of shoreline from the Beach House Marina to and including Bennett Bay. Along this
strip, as shown in Addendum No. 3, are multiple private encroachments (docks) extending
waterward of Lake Coeur d'Alene Drive (former Interstate 90). Including the dock on the
CardStranahan property (Lot 1) and the dock on the Hudson property (adjacent to the Lake CDA
Investments lot (Lot 3)), there are thirty (30) separate private docks currently in existence between
the CmIStranahan property and Bennett Bay. Amended AR 16 at pp. 46-47.
Addendum No. 4 i s a copy of a 1967 photograph. Amended A , , Ex. 26, p. 183. See also
Amended AR 16 at pp. 39-40. Depicted in the background of the photograph is Potlatch Hill.
Amended AR 16 at p. 26. The shoreline depicted includes the present location of a portion of the
Beach House property and Lots 1 (Can), 2 (Keenan), and 3 (Lake CDA Investments) of Carrs'
Marina View Estates.

a.at pp. 25-27.

distillation of matters appearing on other exhibits, including but not limited to Addenda Nos. 2-6 to
this Brief, and represent approximations of the locations of the properties discussed in this Brief.

Also included as Addendum No. 5 is a contemporary photograph of the same area depicted
in Exhibit 26. Amended AR, Ex. 26, p. 183. The photograph included as Addendum No. 5 (Ex. 27)
was taken approximately one week prior to the March 2007 contested case hearing date. Amended

AR 16 at p. 27. The photograph shows the pilings utilized by the Cadstranahan dock (also depicted
in Addenda Nos. 1 and 2). Also depicted in the foreground are encroachments associated with the
Hudsons' dock. Amended AR 16 at pp. 27-28. Depicted in the background is a post- 1967 bulkhead
constructed on the Beach House side of Coeur d'Alene Lake Drive.
Finally, attached as Addendum No. 6 is a copy of the first page of the Carrs' Marina View
Estates Plat. Amended AR, Ex. 10, p. 130. The plat shows the three lots created from the original
CarrJStranahan parcel. These include Lot 1 (Carr), Lot 2 (Keenan), and Lot 3 (Lake CDA
Investments). The Hudson parcel lies south of the southwest comer of Lot 3.
2.

Prior IDT Policy Re: Right-of-way Easements and Retained Littoral
Rights.

ITD's interest in the properties of Lake CDA Investments and Keenan is in the nature of a
an easement. ITD's rights derive from a series of recorded instruments beginning in 1911 and ending
in 1940. Amended AR at Exs. 2,3, and 4, pp. 110-119. The last instrument (Ex. 4) was granted by
the Respondents' predecessors-in-title (Vera and Jack Smith) and is captioned "Right-of-way Deed."
As previously acknowledged by ITD, this instrument, predating March 4, 1953, conveys rights in
the nature of an easement rather than a fee interest:
I wish to point out that ITD is not asserting title to the subject rightof-way. Until March 4, 1953, Idaho Code 3 39-301 stated that by
taking or accepting land for a highway, the public acquired only a
right-of-way and not fee simple. This law was changed in 1953 to
establish that the State acquires fee simple when it acquires land for
a right-of-way. 1953 Idaho Sess. Laws, Chapter 100. Since the right-

of-way was granted in 1941, while the former Idaho Code 5 39-301
was in effect, ITD makes no claim to title.

AR at pp. 15-16.
ITD, in years prior, candidly admitted that which it will not concede here: access rights
acquired under apre-1953 right-of-way easement do not include littoral rights, which are otherwise
retained by the hurdenedproperty owner. In 1995,ITD's then-District Engineer, ToinBaker, advised

IDL, with specific reference to docks on the Silver Beach area (the same area in question here), as
follows:

In reference to our recent discussions, the Department [ITD] has no
objection to Idaho Department of Lands issuing dock permits on this
section of roadway for those private properties where there is
evidence that the property lines originally extended to the lakeshore
and riparian rights exist. These are properties across which the [sic]
ITD now holds an easement for the old Highway.
Our records and plans indicate that the Transportation Department
has jurisdiction over a fifty-foot corridor which is twenty-five feet on
each side of a described centerline. This corridor is the area the
Department maintains. Land lying beyond twenty-five feet from
centerline is considered beyond our jurisdiction.
It is possible that the land beyond twenty-five feet from centerline has
fill material on it belonging to the7~ighwayDepartment. This
material may have been placed there by. -years of maintenance work
or, more than likely, by agreement at the time of construction. It is
common for our Department to obtain temporary easements for the
constructionof slopes. Those temporary easements are written so they
are no longer in effect when construction is complete. The easements
do not encumber the title to the underlying laid. The owner of the
land has all rights when the construction work is completed as they
did previously.
Whateverthe situationmaybe, and irrespective ofthe high water line,
our Depatment can only claimjurisdiction over twenty-five feet each
side of the existing centerline for construction or maintenance work.
If we should have need to go beyond the twenty-five foot line, then

necessary rights to do so would have to be acquired. . . .
CR, Vol. I, pp. 115-116. Respondent sought to bring the referenced position statement of ITD to
the Court's attention through a "Motion to Take Additional Evidence." CR, Vol. I, pp. 117-118.
The District Court denied Respondents' motion. Tr., pp. 10-12. For reasons set forth herein, the
District Court's refusal to consider the Baker correspondence, although not essential to the District
Court's ultimate decision, was in error.
3.

Historical Pacts Regarding the Retained Littoral Rights On the
Petitioners' Properties.

The present-day Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina, Lake CDA Investments, Iceenan, and
Hudsonproperties, all ostensibly fronting on Lake Coeur d' Alene and possessing littoral rights, were
carved from the same "parent parcel," i.e., Government Lot 2. As this Court is aware, government
lots were utilized by the General Land Office for purposes ofmeasuring the upland quantity (acreage
size) of waterfront parcels as the same did not fit "neatly" into the traditional "section" method of
surveying that was otherwise utilized for non-littoral properties. The very use of the term
"government lotnimplies littoral rights when the lot is adjacent to a ~ a t e r w a y . ~
4

As previously noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals:

Govemment lots are portions of square-mile sections surveyed and established by the
United States Government because they do not conform to the ordinary standards for
quarter-quarter sections. See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, MANUAL
OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC LANDS OF THE
UNITED STATES 53-79 (1973). &generally F. CLARK, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF SURVEYING AND BOUNDARIES, Ch. 11 (J. Grimes 4~ ed. (1976)).
Such fractional sections often are remainders or oversized areas resulting from laying
a flat grid system upon a round planet. In other cases they result where section lines
lienear bodies ofwater. There, fractional lots are created so boundaries lie along and
follow the curves the shoreline, thus providing as many lots as practical with
substantial water frontage. F. CLARK, m a 5214.

Turning to the properties at issue, inMay of 1895,the present-dayBeachHouseISilver Beach
Marina property was conveyed f?om the original Government Lot 2 "parent parcel" by Mr. and Mrs.

W. S. Goodwin. Amended ARat Ex. 5, pp. 120-21. Theproperty conveyedwas described as littoral
property, fronting on Lake Coeur d'Alene (e.g., "to the Lakeshore").

Id. This property is referred

to herein as "the Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina property."
Two years later, in 1897, Mr. and Mrs. Goodwin conveyed from their remaining portion of
Government Lot 2 property that includes the present-day Lake CDA Investments, Keenan, and
Hudson properties. Amended AR at Ex. 1, pp. 108-09. As with the Beach HouseISilver Beach
Marina conveyance two years earlier, the 1897 Goodwin conveyance acknowledged the littoral
nature of the property (which includes the present-day properties of the Respondents). The property
was described as "including all riparian rights."

Id.5

In June of 1911, the then-owner of the parcel that the Goodwins had conveyed in 1897
(Armstrong) and Kootenai County entered into a certain Agreement. Amended AR at Ex. 3, pp. 11415. Pursuant to the terms of that Agreement, the parties acknowledged that the property then titled
in the name of Armstrong (which includes the present-day Lake CDA Investments, Keenan, and
Hudson properties) included "all riparian rights." Id.Through the Agreement of 1911, Armstrong
granted Kootenai County aninety-nine (99) year easement for a sixteen (16) foot wide right-of-way.
Id. In consideration for the rights granted under the Agreement, the County agreed to construct "a
substantial wire fence" between the road right-of-way and the Lake, across the remainder of the

Currie v. Walkinshaw, 113 Idaho 586,590,746 P.2d 1045 (Ct. App. 1987).
5

Technicallyspeaking, "riparian" refers to rights ofproperties frontingon rivers and "littoral"
refers to rights of properties fronting on lakes. However, they are often used interchangeably.

Armstrongs' property, "running in a southerly direction into the water of Lake Coeur d' Alene." Id.
No littoral rights were conveyed or encumbered as apart ofthe Agreement. The fact that the property
was littoral, and that the Armstrongs retained those littoral rights, was confirmed by the County's
undertaking to build a fence waterward of the right-of-way, extending into the Lake. Id.

In

1925,

Armstrong,

still

holding

title

to

the

present-day Lake

CDA

Investments/Keenan/I-Iudsonproperties, entered into another Agreement with Kootenai County, to

expand the 1911 right-of-way. Amended AR at Ex. 3, pp. 114-15. As with the 1911 Agreement,
Armstrong did not convey any littoral rights. Further, as with the 1911 Agreement, Kootenai County
agreed to construct "a substantial fence" between the expanded right-of-way and Lake Coeur
d'Alene, again confirming the littoral nature of the property retained by Armstrong. Id.
By 1940, Vera and Jack Smith had succeeded to the Armstrong property. Amended AR at
Ex. 4, pp. 116-19. The Smiths entered into a subsequent Agreement with Kootenai County which
expanded the right-of-way a second time. Id. The littoral rights acknowledged under the 1911 and
1925 Agreements (Exs. 2 and 3) were not specifically conveyed. & Those rights remained in the
possession of the fee owner (Smith) of the burdened property.
AR-er Smith granted the County the right-of-way easement of 1940 (Ex. 4), improvements
were put in by ITD or its predecessor. ITD caused to be prepared drawings in the nature of "asbuilts," which were dated by DOT testimony as having been prepared some time between 1945 and
1950. Amended AR at 16, pp. 178-181; Ex. S, p. 44. Those as-built drawings, depicting the
improvements across the Lake CDA Investments/Keenan/Hudson properties, as completed, show
a "Boat dock" directly in front of the Canproperty (Lot 1 of Cans' Marina View Estates). They also
show a "Boat dock" in front of the Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina property. Id. In other words,

ITD knew that the property encompassedby "Carrs' Marina View Estates9'retainedthe littoral rights
associated therewith, following delivery of the 1940 Right-of-way Deed (Ex. 4), as ITD installed
the improvements ostensibly authorized thereunder and then prepared a set of as-built drawings
showing the location of a boat dock that remained in front of the property that was burdened by the
easement?
4.

Subsequent Events Confirm the Retained Littoral Rights of Properties
Within Government Lot 2.
a.

The "Carrs' Marina View Estates" Property.

The boat dock depicted in ITD's 1945-50 "as built" drawings thereafter remained in place.
Clyde Stranahan succeeded to the Smith's title in the property constituting the present Carrskake
CDA InvestmentsKeenan properties (Carrs' Marina View Estates). In 1977, following adoption of
the Lake Protection Act (LPA), Stranahan made application to IDL to install a new dock in front of
the present-day Can property (Lot 1). Amended AR at pp. 187-91.Inhis application fromDecember
of 1977, Stranahan stated that he had originally installed his dock in 1958 (prior to the LPA) and that
he was seeking approval to replace the same. Id.D L did not question Stranahan's littoral rights and
issued him the requested permit. Id. ITD did not object.
The Cans ultimately succeeded to Stranahan's title to the property, which they ultimately
platted as Cans' Marina View Estates. In March of 2004, the Carrs made application to D L for
permission to replace the Stranahan dock, which had arguably remained in place for at least sixty
(60) years, if not more. Amended AR at pp. 203-15. ITD made no objection. Cans' adjacent littoral
6

Attached as Addendum No. 7 is a copy of an excerpt of Exhibit S. This excerpt
shows the "boat dock" in front of the present-day Can property (Lot 1 of Carrs' Marina View
Estates) following constraction of the improvements authorized under the right-of-way easement
granted the County by Jack and Vera Smith in 1940.
13

owners, including Hagadone Hospitality as the owner of the Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina,
consented. Id.The requestedpermit was issued. This constitutes a d efacto acknowledgment that the
property later platted as Carrs' Marina View Estates @om which the Can parcel was carved (Lot
1)) was vested with littoral rights that survived the granting of the 1940 Right-of-way Deed
(Amended AR at Ex. 4).

b.

The Beach House/Silver Beach Marina Property.

Tn 1982, proceedings were pending in the Kootenai County District Court between Kenneth
and Betty Carlsted, as Plaintiffs, and the State of Idaho as Defendants. Amended AR at Ex. 6. The
Carlsteds succeeded to that portion of Government Lot 2 which had been conveyed by the original
owners thereof (Goodwin) in 1897. Amended AR at Ex. 1. The property is the present site of the
Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina. Amended AR at Ex. 7.
The litigation between the Carlsteds and the State of Idaho resulted in the entry of a stipulated
judgment in favor of the Carlsteds which quieted title in their name to "all riparianrights" associated
with the Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina property. Amended AR at Ex. 6. This is further
collfirmed by a 1986 survey received as Ex. 7.7

7

Curiously, the D L Hearing Examiner offered the followingobservation as to the referenced
Judgment: "[Tlhe plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence and history to definitely tie the Beach House
AR at pp. 151-52. The Hearing Examiner's conclusion
Marina property and the property in question."
was wholly refuted by the record evidence. Had the Hearing Examiner read and understood the exhibits, as
described by witness testimony, the cited conclusion would have been different. Specifically, one can "tie"
the legal description to the Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina property from the 1897 Deed (Amended AR,
Ex. 1, pp. 108-09) to the description contained in the Judgment in Kootenai County Case No. 50700
(Amended AR, Ex. 6, pp. 122-24). The original Deed conveying the title (Ex. I) acknowledged the littoral
nature of the property. The State of Idaho stipulated as much in the Judgment (Ex. 6). The recorded survey
that followed specificallymade reference of the Judgment on the visual depiction of the Beach HouseISilver
Beach Marina property. Specifically, the survey, on the actual Beach HouselSilver Beach Marina property,
as visually depicted, contains the following notation:
FOR OWNERSHIP OF BEACH FRONTAGE AND RIPARIAN RIGHTS SEE

The fact that the Beach HouseJSilver Beach Marina property retained littoral rights is selfevident from the photographic exhibits submitted by the Respondents. For example, the exhibits
which are produced herewith to the Addendum to this Opening Brief contain contemporaneous
photograph showing the subject marina and the panoply of encroachments, docks, gangways, and
pilings associated with the same. The marina and dock system would not otherwise be possible if
the Beach HouseJSilver Beach Marina property was not "littoral" in nature.

e.

The Hudson Property.

The Hudson property was also carved from the Goodwins' original "parent parcel" in
Government Lot 2. In 1922, the present-day Hudson parcel was platted as Lot 1 of the "First
Addition to Silver Beach Park." Amended AR at Ex. 11, p. 132. Consistent with the littoral rights
attributed to the Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina, Cadstranahan, Lake CDA Investments, and
Keenan properties, the Hudson property was depicted as extending to the shore of Lake Coeur
d'Alene, waterward of the right-of-way then in existence.

In August of 2005, the Hudsons applied for a single-family dock on the waters of Lake Coeur
d'Alene adjacent to the Hudson property. Amended AR at Ex. 13, p. 135. Although the parties
entitled to notice of a single-family encroachment permit application are deemed to be the two
adjacent littoral owners, D L saw fit to notify ITD of the Hudson application. Amended AR at Ex.
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& Amended AR, Ex. 7, p. 125. The copy of the Judgment offered by the Petitioners' exhibit (Ex. 6 )
contains the same recording information.
8

Petitioners also submitted the Affidavit of Don Holom, a professional title officer with
twenty-eight (28) years of experience. AR at pp. 111-15. Mr. Holom testified that the present-day Hudson
property was originally part of Government Lot 2, which formed the ''parent" parcel for the Beach
HouseISilver Beach Marina, Cadstranahan, Lake CDA Investments, and Keenan parcels. Id.

14, p. 144. ITD objected, claiming:
The high-water line lies inside of ITD right-of-way where riparian
rights exist. This point is confirmed with the fill that was placed
between the normal summer pool and the roadbed. Therefore, ITD
does not support the building of this dock.
Amended AR at Ex. 15, p. 145. Notwithstanding ITD's objection, and implicitly finding no merit
therein, IDL determined that the Hudsons in fact owned littoral rights and issued the requested
permit. This constituted another de facto determination that the Respondents' properties possess
littoral rights since those properties, like the Hudsonproperty, were derived from the same "parent"
parcel (Government Lot 2). There is no functional difference between the Hudson application, on
the one hand, and the Respondents' applications, on the other hand. In fact, Lake CDA Investments'
application was submitted to IDL in July of 2006, but four (4) months after IDL granted the Hudson
permit. Certainly the law did not change in that intervening period of time. The applications are
legally and factually indistinguishable.The Hudsons have since installed their dock and continue to
enjoy the same. Meanwhile, the Respondentshave remained enmeshed in proceedings for three years
while they await approval of an encroachment that was to be granted under the LPA "with a
minimum of difficulty."

11.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.
ITD and IDL, through their separate Opening Briefs, have adequately framed the general

parameters of the overlapping issues subsumed by the Appellants' consolidatedappeals. In addition,
pursuant to IAR 35(b)(4), Respondents raise the following additional issue on appeal:
1.

Whether Respondents are entitled to an award ofreasonable attorney fees and
costs, as incurred on appeal, pursuant to LC. $12-1 17?

2.

Whether ITD lacked standing to object to the requested encroachments?

111.

3.

Whether ITD failed to timely object?

4.

Whether ITD and IDL are estopped to deny that the Respondents' properties
possess littoral rights?

ARGUMENT.

A.

Standard of Review.

In its Opening Brief, ITD has set forth its contention of the applicable standard of review in

an appeal from a District Court's Decision (itself sitting in its appellate capacity) on a petition for
review from an agency determination pursuant to IDAPA (I.C. 567-5279):
Given the logic expressed by this Court in Losser v. Bradstreet, [I45 Idaho
670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)], the appropriate standard of review in the instant case
would appear to be a review of the District Court decision in light of the criteria set
forth in LC. 567-5279. Adopting that standard of review would put to rest what
appears to be a discrepancy regarding the standard applied to a review of a District
Court decision when it is sitting in an appellate capacity from an agency decision.
Regardless of the standard of review applied, an "agency's factual
detenninations are binding upon [an appellate court] even when there is conflicting
evidence, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial competent
evidence in the record.". . . .
See ITD's Opening Brief at pp. 16-17.
-

B.

The Factual Evidence of Record Irrefutably Establishes that the 1940 Right-ofWay Deed that Encumbers the Respondents' Properties Was Not Intended to
Abrogate the Respondents' Retained Littoral Rights.

As discussed more fully above, in Respondents' "Statement of Facts," all three lots created
by the Carrs' Marina View Estates Plat, together with the adjacent Hudson lot and the adjacent
Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina property, were part of an original government lot (Government
Lot 2) which possessed littoral rights. The Hearing Examiner agreed. CR, Vol. I, p. 32. In fact, the
Hearing Examiner agreed that those littoral rights remained apart of all ofthe effected and described

properties tluough 1940.

a,

In 1940, the Respondents' predecessors-in-title (Vera and Jack Smith) granted Kootenai
County an easement of apredetennined width, measured from the centerline of the mad described
in the instrument. Amended AR at Ex. 4, p. 116. At the contested case hearing, Dirk Roeller, PLS,
on behalf of ITD, agreed that the road construction authorized by the 1940 Smith right-of-way Deed
extended waterward

of the authorized area as described in the easement:

Q.

There is fill placed between the level of the lake today, contemporary lake
level today, and the lakeward boundary of that right-of-way, as described in
the Instrument [the 1940 Right-of-way Deed]?

A.

~ b know,
u
the answer to that question is a good one. The answer is yes....

Q.

And thereby creating a barrier between the watenvard portion of the subject
property and -- now essentially you've landlocked the waterward portion of
the subject property?

A.

That's probably a very good way to describe it, yes.

Amended AR at 16, pp. 192-93.9
Notwithstanding the effective "landlocking" of the subject littoral parcel, the State, well
before the institution of these proceedings, acknowledged the retained littoral rights of the
Respondents' predecessors notwithstanding the improvements accomplished by the State over and
outside the described easement area. Specifically,sometime between 1945 and 1950, after installing
the improvements across theRespondents7properties as authorized by the 1940Right-of-WayDeed,
the State prepared drawings in the nature of "as-builts." Amended AR at Ex. S, p. 44. An excerpt
9

Incredibly, D L claims that the Respondents' "predecessors-in-interest expressly
consented to having their shoreline filled in order to accommodate the highway." See DL'S
Opening Brief at p. 32. There is= evidence that the Respondents' predecessors consented to allow
the State to go outside of the specifically defined easement area if the intention was to usurp the
underlying littoral rights.

of Exhibit "S" is included as Addendum No. 7 to this Brief. See also Amended AR at 16, pp. 17881. Those as-built drawings, depicting the improvements across from the Respondents' properties,
as completed, show a "boat dock" in the area that includes Government Lot 2. Obviously, if the
State believed that it had somehow usurped, acquired, or subordinated the littoral rights of the
Respondents' predecessors through delivery of the 1940Right-of-way Deed, it wouldnot have then
completed those improvements and, through the "as-built" drawings, depicted a "boat dock"
extending waterward from the same. Curiously, neither ITD nor IDL devote much discussion in
their 84 collective pages of briefing to Exhibit S.

If there was any doubt that ITD (and D L for that matter) acknowledged the retained littoral
rights of the Respondents' properties, following completion of the improvements and the preparation
of Exhibit "S," then the events of the years that followed only served to dispel such doubt.
Specifically, Clyde Stranahan thereafter succeeded to the Smiths' title in the Respondents'
properties. In 1977, following adoption of the LPA, Stranahan applied to D L to install a new dock
in front of the Respondents' properties. Amended AR, pp. 187-91. In his application, Stranahan
stated that he had originally installed his dock at the same location in 1958. Id. He was seeking
approval to replace the same given the intervening adoption of the LPA in 1974.

Id. Neither IDL

nor ITD questioned Stranahan's littoral rights and the requested permit was duly issued.

Id.

The Carrs ultimately succeeded to Stranahan's title. Before platting the Stranahan property
into three lots (through the Carrs' Marina View Estates Plat (Addendum No. 6)),the Cam made
application to D L to replace the Stranahan dock. Neither IDLnor ITD questioned the Carrs' littoral
rights and the requested permit was issued.
The approvals given for the Stranahan and Carr encroachments werenot isolated occurrences.

Other portions of the same parent parcel (Government Lot 2) were granted encroachment permits
by D L , with no objection being interposed by ITD. In August of 2005, the Hudsons (who owned
the property immediately adjacent to the south border of the property platted by the Carrs) applied
for a single-family dock. Amended AR at Ex. 13, p. 135. Although ITD owned no adjacent littoral
property (sufficient to confer standing to object under I.C. $58-1305(b)), ITD nonetheless objected
to the application, claiming:
The high-water line lies inside of ITD right-of-waywhere riparian rights exist. This
point is confirmed with the fill that was placed between the normal summerpool and
the roadbed. Therefore, ITD does not support the building of this dock.
Amended AR at Ex. 15, p. 145. Notwithstanding ITD's objection, and implicitly finding no merit
therein, D L determined that the Hudsons had in fact retained littoral rights to their portion of
Government Lot 2 and issued the requested permit.

In fact, over the 55+ years that followed completion of the improvements authorized by the
1940 Smith Right-of-way Deed, two (2) encroachments have been specifically authorized on the
Respondents' portion of Government Lot 2, one on the Hudson portion, and numerous
encroachments on the Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina portion. In 2006, the Carrs lawfullyplatted
their portion of Government Lot 2 into three lots. Amended AR at Ex. 10, p. 130. Lot 3 is owned
by Lake CDA Investments. Lot 2 is owned by Keenan. Apparently, ITD and D L claim that the only
portions of Government Lot 3 that didnot retain littoral rights following executionofthe 1940 Smith
Right-of-way Deed are the portions owned by Respondents Lake CDA Investments and Keenan.
Not surprisingly, neither ITD nor D L offer

factual or legal authority sufficient to distinguish the

Lake CDA InvestmentsKeenan properties from the other properties included in Government Lot 2,

including the Carr and Hudson properties.1°
The legal effect of the facts described herein, and the irrationality of the conduct of ITD and
D L in light of the same, was not lost on the District Court. The District Court, after conducting a
thorough analysis of the facts and case law from Idaho and numerous other states, concluded that the
Respondents' properties retained littoral rights based on the following record facts:
(1)

The expressed language of the 1940 Smith Right-of-way Deed limits its
purpose to "a right for a public highway";

(2)

The 1940 Smith Right-of-way Deed is silent as to littoral rights;

(3)

The subject properties of Respondents were originally part of a government
lot, as were the properties of Hudson, Carr, and the Beach HouseISilver
Beach Marina;

(4)

At the time the 1940 Smith Right-of-way Deed was executed, and extending
through 1953, the then-existing variant of LC. 539-301 mandated that by
accepting land for a highway, the public only acquired a "right-of-way" and
not fee simple; and

(5)

The actions of ITD and D L from 1940through the present belied their claim
that the Respondents' properties possessed no littoral rights.

'O

Apparently, ITD and D L claim that littoral rights on the same government lot can
be parceled out depending on who makes the application. Since a government lot is intended to
convey title to the ordinary high water mark (OHWM), how exactly is it that the same government
lot can have littoral rights on both ends (the Hudson and Carr properties) but none in the middle (the
Lake CDA Investmenls and Keenan properties)? The Argument now advanced by ITD and D L is
not only incredible, it flies in the face of prior pronouncements by ITD as to this very geographic
area. In 1995, ITD's district engineer admitted:
[Tlhe Department has no objection to Idaho Department of Lands issuing dock
permits on this section [Silver Beach] of roadway for those private properties where
there is evidence that the property lines originally extended to the lakeshore and
riparian rights exist. These are properties across which the ITD now holds an
easement for the old highway.
Amended AR at p. 4

CR, Vol. 11, p. 325. It is not surprising then that the District Court concluded that, given IDL's
approval of the Hudson application mere months before the submittal of the Respondents'
applications, that DL'S actions as to Respondents were "arbitrary, capricious, [and] an abuse of
discretion" under I.C. $67-5279. CR, Vol. D, pp. 34-35.
C.

The District Court Correctly Determined that IDL Erred, as a Matter of Law,
by Finding that the Respondents' Properties Retained no Littoral Rights
Following Execution of the 1940 Smith "Right-of-way Deed."

1.

The Extent of ITD's Interest Under the 1940 Smith "Right-of-Way
Deed" is Determined by State Law.

The Smith Right-of-way Deed upon which ITD relies was granted in 1940. The variant of
Idaho Code $39-301 in effect at the time statutorily defined the nature of ITD's interest as a mere
easement. Before the Respondents had submitted their respective applications, ITD itself
acknowledged that it held nothing more than an easement. AR at pp. 15-16. Further, until the
Respondents' applicationswere filed, ITD had long acknowledgedthe Respondents' retained littoral
rights. "[Tlhe Department has no objection to Idaho Department of Lands issuing dock permits on
this section of roadway for those private properties where there is evidence that the property lines
originally extended to the lakeshore and riparian rights exist." AR at p. 4 (emphasis added).
2.

A Specific Easement for a Right-of-way Does Not Include the Servient
Owners' Retained Littoral Rights.

Under Idaho law, "It is well established ... that an easement is the right to use the land of
another for a specific purpose." McKavv. Boise Proiect Board of Control, 141 Idaho 463,471,111
P.3d 148 (2005). Every easement "is a particular easement, privileging the owner thereof to make

particular uses of the servient estate."

Id.

Under Idaho law, the use of the term "right-of-way," in the substantive part of a deed, creates

an easement, and not a transfer in fee simple. Hash v. U.S., 403 F.3d 1308 (C.A. Fed. Idaho (2005)).
An easement does not include the right to enlarge the use to the injury of the servient land.

v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46,74 P.2d 950 (Ct. App. 1985).
The 1940 deed at issue specificallyprovides that it is for a "right-of-way." So too do the two
(2) predecessor deeds. Amended AR at Exs. 2 and 3, pp. 110-15. Moreover, the deeds specifically
acknowledge the littoral nature of the properties which they burdened. JcJ.It is self-evident that they
did not include any right of control over the Respondents' littoral rights given that the authorized
and/or unauthorized improvements constructed pursuant thereto were documented by "as-built"
drawings that verified the continued location and maintenance of a "boat dock." Amended AR at
Ex. S, p. 44. Coupled with the "as-builts" are 60 years of subsequent maintenance of a boat dock
on the same property from which the Respondents' parcels were subdivided.
Moreover, ITD, as the beneficial owner of an easement, could not enlarge the easement to
the injury of the servient estate. Menill v. Penrod, m.Any authorization to ITD to construct the
necessary improvements (including fill) required for the stability of the road did not (and could not)
authorize an expansion of that right so as to usurp, obtain, or preempt the Respondents' underlying
littoral rights. Any argument to the contrary is simply unsupported by the factual history applicable
to these parcels and by Idaho law.

In Akers v. D.L. White Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005), this Court
again reaffirmed long-standing law which is particularly applicable here.
An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not
inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner.
Akers v. D.L. White Construction. Inc., 142 Idaho at 301 (citing Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,

229, 76 P.3d 969 (2003)). Such is the case here. A right-of-way deed, limited in scope, cannot
somehow be expanded to subsume littoral rights which have absolutelynothing to do with the nature
of the right defined in the an easement.
3.

The Respondents' Retained Littoral Rights Included theRight to Wharf
Out.

Idaho law makes clear that littoral rights include the fundamental right of the landowner to
maintain his or her adjacency to the waterway. Brett v. Eleventh Street Dock Owners Association,
141 Idaho 517, 521, 112 P.3d 80.5 (2005). Littoral rights also include the right to build "aids to
navigation."

I.C. $58-1302(f).
4.

The Circumstances Surrounding the Parties' Historic Intentions
Confirm that Respondents' Properties Retain Littoral Rights.

In the event that the subject Right-of-way Deed is ambiguous (a point not conceded), then
the instrument is to be construed in connection with the intention of the parties and the circumstances
in existence at the time the easement was given and canied out. Akers v. D. L. White Construction,

Inc.,142 Idaho at 304.

The question is easily resolved here. ITD's actual "as-built" drawings,

prepared after completion of the improvements authorized by the 1940 Deed, confirmed the
continued coexistence of a "boat dock." Amended AR at Ex. S, p. 44. Moreover, IDL's subsequent
reauthorization of encroachments, including encroachments on the very parcels at issue here, with
no objection from ITD, conclusively negates ITD's present contention that it somehow acquired the
Respondents' littoral rights through delivery of the 1940 Deed.
5.

The District Court Correctly Determined that IDL Erred, as a Matter of
Law, by Concluding that Respondents' Retained no Littoral Rights.
a.

IDL Had Jurisdiction to Determine, in the Context of
Respondents' Applications, the nature of Respondents' Littoral

Rights.
DL, on appeal and for the first time in this proceeding, intimates that it did not have
authority to determine the nature of Respondents' littoral rights for purposes of processing the
subject applications. See DL'S Opening Brief at pp. 27-28. This contention is baseless.
Issuance of a lake encroachment permit, i.e., permission to place a dock on the lake,
necessarily contemplates a determination of littoral rights as defined by the Idaho
Lake Protection Act.
Brett v. Eleventh Street Dock Owners Association, 141 Idaho at 521.
b.

The District Court Correctly Determined that the Hearing
Examiner's Reliance Upon Bowman v. McGoldrick Lumber
Company Was Erroneous as a Matter of Law.

DL'S Hearing Examiner concluded, as a matter of law, that, "It is established precedent in
Idaho that a right-of-way deed can sever riparian rights." CR, Vol. I at p. 31 (citing Bowman v.
McGoldrick Lumber Company, 39 Idaho 30,219 P. 1063 (1923)). The District Court correctly
concluded that the Hearing Examiner erred as amatter of law. The arguments now advanced by ITD
to the contrary are unavailing.
This case deals with an easement arising under State law as it existed prior to 1953.
Although denominated a "right-of-way deed," the instrument conveys no title greater than an
easement for the limited purposes expressed therein. It is to be construedunder Idaho law applicable
to easements. It cannot be expanded to subsume other uses. It has no attributes of a fee interest.
To the contrary, in Bowman v. McGoldrick, m,this Court dealt with a railroad right-of-waythat
was held to have severed the burdened properties' littoral rights. However, the Hearing Examiner
in this case clearly erred, as amatter of law, and the District Court so held, by failing to acknowledge
or recognize the differing statutory attributes of a federal railroad right-of-way from a

m highway

right-of-way. As noted, the latter is an easement. As set forth in Bowman v. McGoldrick, the
former, a creature of federal statute, has the attributes of a fee interest and "is more than a mere
easement." Bowman v. McGoldrick, 38 Idaho at 33,219 P. at 1064.
The Hearing Examiner's erroneous construction of Bowman was not lost upon the District
Court:
This Court agrees with the landowners that "the Hearing Examiner wholly misread
and expanded [the] Bowman decision." .... Bowman concerned a federal railroad
right-of-way (not a state highway right-of-way), and as noted right inBowman by the
Idaho Supreme Court, a federal railroad right-of-way is more than a mere easement
and has the attributes of a fee interest! The Idaho Supreme Court in Bowman, citing
Oregon Short Line R.R. Comvanv v. Stalker, 14 Idaho 371, 390, 94 P. 59 (1908)
wrote:
There [referringtoK.& T. Ry, Companvv. Roberts, 152 U.S. 114,14
S. Ct. 496,38 L. Ed. 377 (it is held that such grants) from the federal statute
3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 511,30 Stat. at Large 990 (U.S. Comp. St. §§4181-4188)
[have the 'attributes of the fee, perpetuity and exclusive use and
possession'.] ... Under said decision it is apparent that the nature of the grant
made in this case as to the right-of-way and station grounds is a base,
qualified, or limited fee and is more than a mere easement, giving the
exclusive possession and right of the use of the land for the purposes
contemplated by the law;
38 Idaho 30,33,219P. 1063 (64) (emphasis addedby theDistrict Court). Incredibly,
the ITD claims in its brief, the situation of Bowman ". ..is verv similar to the situation
at,
where the undisputed evidence shows that ITD has obtained a right-of-way
that extends waterward from the upland property, and that the current road is
constructed on fill or near the edge of the upland property and to the lake."
(Emphasis added).... The situation in Bowman is not even remotely similar. In
Bowman, the railroad's right-of-way was a
from an act of Conmess of the
United States, and that g.rant was given to the railroad before Bertha Bowman
received her patent from the government for her property.
CR, Vol. II,pp. 331-32 (emphasis supplied by the District Court).
On appeal, ITD offers no cogent authority to support a conclusion, as a matter of law, other
than that reached by the District Court and this Court in Bowman. ITD essentially posits that its

easement should be analogized to a federal railroad easement, possessing the attributes of a fee
interest. Yet ITD conveniently ignores the limitations contained in Idaho Code 539-301 prior to
March 4,1953

60 years of acquiescence in and to the right of the Respondents' predecessors-in-

title to maintain encroachments waterward of the very properties now at issue.
The case of West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 554, 511 P.2d 1326 (1973) is perhaps more
instructive. In West v. Smith, Kootenai County acquired a road right-of-way upon West's property
by prescription. 95 Idaho at 555. Smith maintained a houseboat moored to pilings driven in the lake
bed adjacent to the terminus oftheright-of-way, with agangplank accessing the shore. West brought
suit seeking removal of Smith's houseboat.
This Court affirmed the trail court's ruling that the littoral owner whose property was
burdened by the right-of-way easement, even though it extended to the shore, retained the right of
access to the lake "free from unreasonable interference." 95 Idaho at 555. The case did not
specifically deal with any other littoral right, although it implicitly acknowledged that West would
otherwise retain the littoral right to wharf out. Specifically, this Courl found that Smith's
maintenance of a gangplank to the shore would otherwise interfere with the littoral rights maintained
by West.
The case supports the proposition that parties (such as the Respondents), who own fee title
to littoral land by a right-of-way easement, retain the littoral rights that make their property unique.
What makes this result particularly appropriate here is the fact that the improvements made by ITD,
pursuant to a right-of-way easement, were acknowledged by prior ITD representatives to be limited
to such a degree as to

constitute some sort of usurpation of the Respondents' retained littoral

rights. The right-of-way in West v. Smith arose under Idaho law. The right-of-way in Bowman v.

McGoldrick arose under federal law. To the extent there is a conflict between the two cases, the
holding in West v. Smith applies. This distinction was properly noted by the District Court which
determined that West v. Smith was instructive as to the facts at bar. CR, Vol. II, pp. 3 10-11.
c.

The District Court Properly Determined That the Hearing
Examiner Erred by Creating a "Subordination" of Littoral
Rights Doctrine.

The Hearing Examiner concluded that following delivery of the 1940 Right-of-way Deed,
the Respondents' predecessors-in-interest had "subordinated" their littoral rights to ITD's right-ofway. "When that subordination occurred [in 19401, the [Respondents'] property lost those parts of
their littoral rights which support the ability to wharf out." CR, Vol. I, p. 33. Alternatively stated,
ITD claims that the Respondents' predecessors-in-title"implicitly dedicated" their littoral rights to
the public. ITD offered the District Court no cogent legal authority for this proposition and the Court
so held:
ITD argues: "The easement acquired by ITD for the highway in question in 1940
included an implied dedication of littoral rights to the public." .... There is no citation
to any case or statute given for this bald claim by ITD. [Sluch a claim of "implied
dedication of littoral rights to the public" is directly contrary to the Idaho Supreme
Court case of West v. Smith, ... and contrary to all case law this Court has been able
to find from other jurisdictions [citing authorities from New York, Wisconsin,
California, Connecticut, Washington, and Maryland]. There simply'is no implied
dedication of littoral rights to the public.
CR, Vol. II at p. 333. ITD has still failed to offer any cogent authority contrary to the District
Court's legal conclusion.

D.

The Ownership Issue as to Fill Placed Outside the Easement Area by ITD is
Irrelevant.

ITD concedes that the issue concerning ownership of fill placed outside of the specifically
defined ITD easement area is irrelevant. "[Wlhether Keenan and Lake CDA own the fill placed by

the State into Lake Coeur d'Alene to build the highway right-of-way is of no significance."
ITD's Opening Brief at p. 38. Nor does ITD claim that Respondents have no right of access to the
lake regardless of the ownership of any such fill. "ITD has no objection to [Respondents]exercising
their right of access to the lake at this point." CR, Vol. I, p. 175. The only issue with respect to the
fill is whether ITD, as the benefitted party under aright-of-way easement across littoral property, can
effectively "confiscate" the servient owner's littoral rights by placing fill outside of the authorized
easement area, and effectively landlocking the littoral parcel.
The District Court properly concluded, as amatter oflaw, that the Respondents retained their
littoral rights regardless of ITD's placement of fill waterward of, and outside of, the authorized
easement area. The Court's conclusion was based in part on the following factors:
(1)

The subject Right-of-way Deed was for one purpose only "a right-of-way for
a public highway." It was silent as to littoral rights;

(2)

ITD could not unilaterally enlarge the easement area to the damage of the
servient landowners;

(3)

ITD could not enlarge the authorized uses under the easement to the damage
of the servient landowners; and

(4)

The actions of ITD and IDL following construction of the improvements
authorized by the 1940 Right-of-way Deed were directly contrary to the
position they now advance. These actions include the preparation oras-built
drawings" (Ex. S) showing the coexistence of a dock on this very property
following construction of the improvements; the existence of a dock on the
subject property for the better part of 60 years; subsequentthe reauthorization
of that dock on no less than two separate occasions through IDL with no
objection by ITD; and the authorization of a dock on the adjacent parcel (the
Hudson parcel) which, together with the Respondents' properties, were
originally part of the same "parent parcel" (Government Lot 2).

The District Court's conclusion was also supported in law. The Court undertook an

extensive analysis of legal authorities from amultitude of other jurisdictions, all ofwhich supported
the conclusion that "the State of Idaho placing fill in Lake Coeur d'Alene at the landowners'
shoreline boundary has no effect on the landowners' littoral rights." CR, Vol. 11, pp. 325-31. ITD
and D L argue that the District Court had no jurisdiction to determine ownership of any such
unauthorized fill." Thejurisdictional issue is irrelevant. Both IDL, and the District Court on appeal,
had jurisdiction to determine the nature and extent of Respondents' littoral rights.

Brett v.

Eleventh Street Dock Owners Association, 141 Idaho at 521. That is exactly what the Court did.
It determined, based upon the undisputed record facts, as summarized above, and the considerable
weight of analogous legal authority, that the Respondents' littoral rights had not been confiscated,
implicitly dedicated, or subordinated by the placement of fill in violation of the terms of the
easement.
E.

ITD is Estopped to Claim that its Own Permitting Process has any Relevance
to the Encroachment Permit Sought from IDL.

Both ITD and IDL claim that Respondents cannot make use of the requested encroachments
without obtaining a separate right-of-way encroachment permit from ITD. Presumably, it is the
Appellants' position that the Respondents need permission from ITD to cross artificial fill
impermissibly placed by ITD between the Respondents' original littoral boundaries and the current
boundaries. This contention is baseless. ITD itself has admitted, in these very proceedings, that it
I1

The District Court did observe that the artificial fill would inure to the benefit of the
Respondents based upon prevailing authorities: "These cases correctly announce the law ... that
when artificial accretions are cast upon the land of the landowner by either the Corps. of Engineers
or some stranger without the intervention of the upland owner such artificial accretion inures to the
title of the upland owner." CR, Vol. 11, p. 329 (citing H. K. Porter Company. Inc. v. Board of
Supervisors of Jackson County, 324 So.2d 746, 750 (Miss. 1975) (additional citations omitted).
Otherwise, the littoral landowner could effectively be "landlocked" and unable to exercise the
control aspect of his or her littoral property.

"has no objection to [Respondents] exercising their right of access to the Lake...." CR, Vol. I, p.
175. ITD is now estopped to claim otherwise.
Moreover, even if such a permit requirement could be validly imposed, the requirement only
applies to "structures" or "obstructions" placed on the right-of-way. See, ex., State ex. rel. Burns
v. Kelly, 89 Idaho 139, 146-47, 403 P.2d 566 (1965). See also IDAPA 39.03.42.200.01.
Respondents have proposed no encroachments of any significance on any authorized portion of the
ITD right-of-way as defined by the easement.
In rejoinder, ITD claims that it can do anything it wants with the right-of-way road prism,

regardless of whether or not it is located within the authorized easement area. ITD relies, invariably,
~egu1ations.l~
These citations
on various authorities, including Idaho Code and Idaho ~drninistrative
are of no moment.
First, they were all promulgated after the granting of the 1940 easement to ITD. There is no
authoritythat would allow ITD to unilaterally change private property rights, created by contractual
agreements, through legislative or administrative fiat. Second, if said authoritiespertain, they do not
grant ITD jurisdiction or authority over encroachmentson the water. See, ex., Ritter v. Standal, 98
Idaho 446,556 P.2d 769 (1977).

Idaho Attorney General Opinion 83-6 (Although authorized

generally to establish zoning ordinances under the Local Planning Act, a county is preempted from
regulating lakeencroachments by the Lake Protection Act).
ITD, joined by DL, argued that the proposed encroachments (to wit, floating docks
waterward of the OHWM) would interfere with the "integrity" of the road prism. The District Court

'

The cited authorities are Idaho Code $340-310(9) and (1); 40-313(2); and DAPA

39.03.42.
31

properly concluded that this argument bordered on the absurd and was unsupported by substantial
evidence viewing the record as a whole.
The two applications sought approval of encroachments extendingwatenvardof the OHWM.
AR, pp. 19,70. The proposed encroachments have nothing more than a de minimis "contact" with

any portion of the road prism or right-of-way. Does ITD really contend that a road prism intended
to support a former interstate transportation system will actually be degraded or compromised
because less than one foot of docking touches the watenvard extension of the same at the presumed
ordinary high water mark? In fact, the utter speciousness of this claim is undermined by the fact that
no less than 30 other private encroachments are located in a similar manner up and down Lake Coeur
d'Alene Drive. Immediately to the north of the Respondents' properties lies a significant
commercial establishment,with one ofthe largest privately-maintained marinas on the Lake, as well
as a gargantuan condominium complex, all authorized in remarkablyclose proximity to the northern
extension of the prism. Amended AR at p. 186. Immediately to the south is a private encroachment
authorized by IDLmere months before these applications were submitted. Apparently, IDL and ITD
claim that the &encroachments that could interfere with this expanse of road prism are the six to
12 inches of access planking to the requested docks. The claim that these two de minimis access

plankings would interfere with ITD's road prism underscores the arbitrary and capricious nature of
the agency action given the prior approvals for 30 docks on neighboring portions of the purported
"prism."

F.

The "Most Unusual of Circumstances" Prong of I.C. $58-1305(a)is
Inapplicable.

LC. $58-1305(a) provides, inter alia, that applicationsfor residential docks on waters abutting

littoral properties shall not be denied "except in the most unusual of circumstances...." IDL argues
that the requested permits were properly denied based upon the "most unusual of circumstances"
prong of 558-1305(a). This argument is specious.
First, the Hearing Examiner's twelve (12) page Recommendation neither mentions nor
discusses "the most unusual of circumstances" prong. CR, Vol. I, pp. 23-34. Simply put, whether
or not the requested encroachmentswere "the most unusual" was not an issue argued to the Hearing
Examiner by D L or ITD and IDL's attempt to now interject the issue in the case is untimely and
unmerited.
Second, even if the concept was applicable, despite IDL's procedural infirmities, what
preciselymakes these encroachmentsany more "unt~snal"than the 30 neighboring private docks that
D L has authorized along the same expanse ofpurported right-of-way or road "prism"? What makes
this encroachment any more unusual than the StranahanICarr encroachment which IDL authorized
on the very property from which the Respondents' lots were subdivided?
IDL responds that the "most unusual of circumstances" arose "when ITD intervened in the
permit application proceedings" claiming, inter alia, that ITD "held the littoral rights according to
the application."

See IDL's Opening Brief at p. 6.

This assertion is somewhat disingenuous given

that IDL, mere months before these applications were submitted, foundnothing "unusual" about the
Hudson application, next door to the Lake CDA Investments' property, and issued the requested
encroachment permit over ITD's objection.
G.

ITD Lacks Standing to Object.

ITD had no standing to participate in proceedings below given its Iack of ownership of
adjacent property with littoral rights & given the untimeliness of its objections. Pursuant to LC.

558-1305, an application for a single-family encroachment permit "shall be processed by the Board
with a minimum of procedural requirements and shall not be denied nor appearancerequired" except
in the most unusual of circumstances or if the proposed encroachment infringes upon the "littoral
rights of an adjacent property owner." ITD owns no property adjacent to either Respondent that
includes littoral rights. ITD had no statutory basis to object to either application.
D L argues that ITD had standing due to "the most unusual of circumstances." However, as
noted above, "unusual circumstances" was an issue that played no role in these administrative
proceedings. It did not form the basis for the notice, it was not discussed by the Hearing Examiner,
and the Hearing Examiner's report does not reference the same.
Second, as to timing, $58-130501) provides: "The application itself shall be deemed
sufficient notice if the adjacent owner is the State of Idaho." Since ITD alleges it owns the road
right-of-way, adjacent to the Respondents' parcels, then for the sake of argument the submittal of
the application constituted de facto notice of the same to ITD.
Section 58-1305(b) requires the adiacent littoral owner to object within ten (10) days after
notice of an application. Pursuant to DAPA 20.03.04.025.03, which conflicts with $58-1305@),
the adjacent littoral owner has twenty-one (21) days within which to object. Notwithstanding the
fact that ITD owns no adjacent property with littoral rights, and assuming (for the sake of argument)
that it was entitled to object, ITD failed to timely do so under either the statutory or administrative
standards cited.
Lake CDA Investments' application was filed on July 31,2006. AR, p. 17. Written notice
of the application was provided to ITD on September 6,2006. @. at p. 48. ITD objected on October
10,2006. @. at p. 53. ITD's objection came thirty-four (34) days after DL'S notice, which, under

the more liberal administrative standard (21 days), was thirteen (13) days too late. No hearing was
necessary as ITD utterly failed to follow the requisite statutory & administrative procedures and
deadlines.
With respect to the Keenan application, filed onNovember 17,2006, there was

objection

by either adjacent littoral owner (Lake CDA Investments or Carr). Further, ITD's ostensible
objection, although not made a part of the administrative record, was apparently dated January 8,
2007. CR, Vol. I, p. 26. As with its objections to the Lake CDA Investments' application, ITD's
objection to the Keenan application was patently untimely. Pursuant to 558-1305, the requested
permits should have been issued, "with a minimum of procedural requirements" and no appearance
should have been required. ITD waived any entitlement to object.

H.

ITD and IDL are Equitably Estopped to Deny that Respondents' Properties
Retain the Littoral Right of Wharfage.

Unlike equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel does not require as a necessary ingredient
concealment or misrepresentation of existing facts. Sagewillow v. Idaho Department of Water
Resources, 138 Idaho 831, 845, 70 P.3d 669 (2003). Quasi-estoppel "applies when it would be
unconscionable to allow a party to assert a right that is inconsistent with a prior position."

Id. In

light of these standards, the Court should consider the following.
First, prior to the platting of Carr's Marina View Estates, the Carr, Keenan, and Lake CDA
Investments properties were all part of one parcel. Second, the owners of those properties granted
aright-of-way to the state. Third, the right-of-way was installed and drawings were prepared by ITD
showing the improvements (Ex. S). Fourth, the improvements acknowledged the retained right of
the servient owner to maintain a "boat dock." Fifth, that boat dock has remained in existence for 60

years. Sixth, the boat dock has been repermitted on no less than two occasions. Seventh, the boat
dock has remained in plain view of ITD and the public for 60 years and if ITD had an objection or
claim that no littoral rights existed,one would have expected to hear of it. Eighth, the fact that the
original parcel has been platted into three lots is of no legal significance in terms of littoral rights.
How exactly is it that one part of the property can have littoral rights (the C a r parcel (Lot 1)) and
the remainder (Lots 2 and 3) do not? The problem is further compounded when both neighboring
parcels (the BeachHouse and Hudsonparcels) are acknowledged by ITD to have littoral rights given
the existence and perpetuation of encroachments in the waters abutting the same. Given the
foregoing, it is plainly inequitable and unconscionable to allow ITD to disavow its prior
acknowledgment of the continued existence and retention of Respondents' littoral rights."

I.

The District Court Properly Awarded Respondents Attorney Fees.

On March 24, 2008, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision. On March 28,
2008, Respondents filed their Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. a.at p. 336. Respondents
sought an award of fees under LC. $12-117. ITD and IDLobjected and separately moved to disallow
Respondents' claims.

Id. at pp. 352 (ITD) and 365 (IDL).

On May 6, 2008, Respondents filed a

Supplemental Affidavit of Costs and Fees (CR, Vol. 11, p. 406), adding to their claim $1,282.50 in

j3

The inequity of the Appellants' positions is M h e r underscored by admissions and
acknowledgments contained in a 1990 communication to IDL from ITD's then-District engineer.
CR, Vol. I, pp. 115-16. Respondents moved the District Court for leave to supplement the record
with the cited correspondence given that its existence was not made known to Respondents until
after the Hearing Examiner had ruled. Id. at pp. 111-19. Although the referenced 1990 document
is not essential to this Court's affirmance of the District Court's decision, the document nonetheless
underscores the inequity of these agencies' conduct. While acknowledging that "it's a close call,"
the District Court nonetheless erred in excluding the property document. Tr., pp. 11-13.
Nonetheless, given that they are public agencies, and, as IDL has claimed, "neutral," it defies reason
why these agencies would object to the Court's consideration of the truth.

fees incurred following the filing of the initial fee request of March 28,2008.
OnMay 20,2008, the Court grantedRespondentsYfee request. @. at pp. 418-424. The Court
denied the request of ITD and D L to strike the Respondents' Supplemental Affidavit of Fees (filed
May 6,2008), thereby granting the fee request in total under the authority of LC. 5 12-117. @. The
Court specifically found that the positions advanced by ITD and IDL before the Court, as well as the
positions advanced by ITD before IDL, were unsupported in fact and in law. The Court further
found that IDL's administrative decision was arbitrary and capricious and constituted an abuse of
discretion. @.
LC. 5 12-117 "is not discretionarybut provides that the Court must award attorney fees where
a state agency did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or law in a proceeding involving a person
who prevails in the action." Fischer v. Citv of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 355-56, 109 P.3d 1091
(2005).
By now this Court has a full grasp of the factual and procedural background to this appeal.
Suffice to say that ITD acknowledged the littoral rights of Respondents' predecessor-in-title in the
1940s, after constructingthe improvements ostensibly authorizedunderthe Right-of-way Deed, and
for 60 years thereafter. These acknowledgments included the dock in place as shown on the "asbuilt" drawings, the dock put in by Stranahan, the repermitted dock of Stranahan, and the dock put
in by Carr. ITD made no claim of littoral rights. The same holds true with respect to the 30 other
families who have neighboring docks, including the Hudsons.
ITD argued that the littoral rights of these Respondents, as contrasted to any of the other 30
dock owners (including the Hudsons who live next door), had been "implicitly dedicated,"
"subordinated," or otherwise with virtually no supporting legal authority under Idaho law. In fact,

ITD's position ran directly afoul of instructions given by its District engineer to IDL in 1995. AR
at p. 4.
As for DL, it claims not to have acted as "an adversary" to Respondents. We could all have
such good friends. IDL actually adopted the arguments of ITD and advanced the same to the District
Court. IDLrequired that the Respondents participate in hearings althoughno timely objections were
made, as required by LC. $58-1305, by adjacent owners of littoral rights.
On appeal, IDL claims that a hearing was required because of the "most unusual of
circumstances." Yet IDLnever providednotice of that at any point in time during the administrative
process. Moreover, D L can't show why the proposed encroachments are any moreunusual than the
encroachment IDL authorized on the adjacent property mere months before these applications were
submitted. In fact, it was action of this nature that led the District Court to conclude that IDL had
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The District Court's decision was sound and should be
affirmed.
Finally, both agencies object to the timeliness of the Respondents' Supplemental Affidavit
of Fees (filed May 6, 2008). The agencies' argument constitutes nothing more than a tortured
reading of the rules and case law. IRCP 54(d)(5) provides that a memorandum of costs and fees
must be filed within fourteen (14) days after enhy of judgment. The Respondents' Memorandum
of Costs and Fees was initially filed four days after the Memorandum Decision and prior to the entry
of any monetaryjudgment. The Respondents thereafter filed a SupplementalMemorandum of Costs
to include, inter alia, the time in responding to the agencies' objections to the request for fees. This
was

an initial Memorandum of Costs, but, rather, one to amend and supplement the costs timely

asserted before any monetary judgment on the same had been entered. To accept the position

advanced by the agencies would mean that no party, with a statutory basis for recovering fees, could
recover any fees incurred more than fourteen (14) days after entry of a judicial decision but prior to
entry of a monetary award on the fees. Respondents respectfully request that this is not the law of
Idaho.14

J.

Respondents Seek an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal Pursuant to 1.C. 512117.

Respondents submit to this Court, as they did to the District Court, that D L and lDT have
proceeded without a reasonable basis in fact. This much is evident from the parties' course of
conduct for the near 70 years following the granting of the 1940 Right-of-way Deed. It is also
submitted that the agencies acted without a reasonable basis in law given their advancement of a
theory of "implied dedication" or "subordination" of littoral rights with no accompanying case law.
In any event, those legal authorities were advanced in direct conflict to the undisputed facts that

would otherwise seem to estop both agencies from asserting that Respondents possess no littoral
rights. Respondents are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to LC.

912-117, for the additional reasons advanced in the context of the discussion of the propriety of the
attorney fee award by the District Court as set forth above.
1V.

CONCLUSION.

Basedupon the reasons and authorities set forth above, Respondents respectfully request that
the District Court's "Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal" be affirmed, in its entirety, and
l4

The caseofAllisonv. JohnM. Bisgs, Inc., 121 Idaho 567,826 P.2d 916 (1992), cited
by both agencies, is not dispositive. In that case, an award of fees was sought after entry of the
monetaryjudgment that included the initial fee award. The Court held that LC. 5 12-120(3) did not
form a basis for such an award of fees and, in any event, the request was made more than fourteen
(14) days after entry of the monetaryjudgment that awarded the fees in the first instance. Such is
not the case at bar.

fi

that Respondents recover their attorney fees and costs as incurredon appeal pursuant to LC. $12-117.
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Dated this L 2 a y of June, 2009.

Respondents
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INDEX TO ADDENDA TO RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
NO.
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DESCRIPTION

1

An illustrative aerial photograph showing the location of the tlvee (3) parcels
created by the Carrs' Marina View Estates Plat (Addenda No. 6).

2

A copy of Exhibit 9 from the Agency Record on Appeal (Amended AR at Ex. 9, p.
128). This is an aerial photograph that shows a wider view of the matters depicted
in Addendum No. 1, as well asepicts the expanse of property between the
Carr/Stranahan parcel (Lot 1) and the Hudson parcel.

3

An additional aerial photograph taken from a higher vantage point. Addendum #3
shows lhe area of shoreline from the Beach House Marina to and including
Bennett Bay. Along this strip, as shown in Addendum #3, are multiple private
encroachments (docks) extending watenvard of Lake Coeur d'Alene Drive (former
Interstate 90). The
is included in the Amended AR at Ex. A, p. 5.

4

A copy of Exhibit 26 (Amended AR at p. 183). This photograph shows the area in
question in 1967. In the background is Potlatch Hill. The shoreline depicted
includes the present location of a portion of the Beach House property and Lots 1
(Carr), 2 (Keenan), and 3 (Lake CDA Investments) of Carrs' Marina View Estates.

5

A copy of Exhibit 27 (Amended AR at p. 184). This consists of a contemporary
photograph of the same area depicted in Exhibit 26. The photo was taken
approximately one week prior to the March 2007 hearing date below. The
photograph shows the pilings utilized by the Carr/Stranahan dock (also depicted in
Addenda 1 and 2). Also depicted in the foreground are encroachments associated
with the Hudsons' dock. Depicted in the background is a post-1967 bulkhead
constructed on the Beach House side of Coeur d'Alene Lake Drive.

6

A copy of Exhibit 10 (Amended AR at p. 130). Exhibit 10 is a reduced size copy
of the first page of the Carrs' Marina View Estates Plat, showing the three lots
created from the original CarrIStranahan parcel. These include Lot 1 (Carr), Lot 2
(Keenan), and Lot 3 (Lake CDA Investments).

7

An excerpt of Exhibit "S" (Amended AR at p.44). Exhibit "S' is a drawing
produced by ITD showing improvements in place as authorized by and constructed
under the applicable 1940 right-of-way easement (Amended AR at Ex. 4, p. 116).

-
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I 5 OF SURVEYS AT PAGE 27, KDOTENN COUNW RECORDERS OFFICE.

R-3) SURVEY BY JON MONACO, Pi5 4 194. OCTOBER 2002. RECORDED IN
BOOK 2 1 OF SURVCiS AT PAGE 4 12. KOOTENAI COUNR RECORDERS
OFFICE.
R.4)

SURVZYBY SCOTIFASOR, PLS E374 OCTOBER2003. RECORDED IN
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